Introduction
than trade union) representation, for which no legal aid was available, and in respect of disputes for which costs were (in the absence of vexatious conduct) not awarded. 9 In the national, tri-partite, social pact (discussed further below) of 2006, a significant section focused on the issue of compliance with employment law. The commitments agreed by the social partners (which were published in legislative form in the never-enacted Employment Law (Compliance) Bill 2008) were driven by the outcome of a series of extremely high-profile employment law disputes involving posted, and migrant, workers. 10 The key elements of the Bill were to establish a new labour inspection body, the National Employment Rights Authority (NERA), with enhanced powers of inspection, and powers to co-operate with other state agencies in order to further compliance with employment regulation. NERA was, in fact, 
Collective Rights
In terms of collective employment rights, Ireland provides notably weak legal protection for collective bargaining, and collective worker representation. The Irish Constitution protects the right of freedom of association, but trade unions in Ireland enjoy no rights to be recognised for bargaining purposes by an employer. Thus, Regulation Orders" (EROs), which, when confirmed by the Labour Court, set legally binding minimum wages and conditions of employment for workers in the sectors covered. In 2007, EROs provided: for minimum sectoral rates of pay in excess of the national minimum wage; for sectoral pay scales, based on length of service and skill level; for sectoral overtime payments and premium payments to those required to work on Sundays; and for other benefits for employees in the relevant sectors that were not given by general labour legislation (most notably, a right to sick pay). 16 Thus, both the REA and JLC systems represented a significant departure from the Irish (indeed, Anglo-American) norm, 17 in that terms and conditions of employment were not settled through direct contractual negotiations between the employer and its workers, but rather, employment standards were set, and applied, not only for employers that recognised trade unions and union members, but also for employers which did not engage in collective bargaining.
(ii) Trade Union Recognition
Ireland has never had a statutory union recognition procedure (SRP), such as that introduced by the UK government in Schedule A1 of the Employment Relations Act 1999. 18 bargaining purposes, to seek to have specific disputes with regard to pay, terms and conditions of employment and dispute resolution procedures addressed, by means, ultimately, of a legally binding determination of the Labour Court. This clearly did not amount to "collective bargaining", 20 but did enable trade unions a mechanism to "demonstrate" effectiveness to both members and, crucially, non-members at organisational level, and did ensure the "shadow of the law" hung over recalcitrant Congress of Trade Unions-ICTU); and the employers (represented primarily by the main employers' association, the Irish Business and Employers Confederation-IBEC-but also by sector specific groups, like the Construction Industry Federation). 22 The social pacts each ran for three years, focusing on issues of pay (for the public sector and the unionised private sector), tax reform and a range of other socioeconomic issues. 23 Thus, the Irish trade union movement and the main employer representative groups had a strongly institutionalised role in national socio-economic governance. The bargaining and implementation processes under the "social partnership" process were voluntary, with unilateral withdrawal by any party possible at any time. However, a number of key labour law measures were agreed, which were then progressed through the normal legislative process; for example, legislation on a national minimum wage, 24 and throughout the period, agreements between public sector management and trade unions on public sector pay, reform and management measures were agreed and, almost without exception, implemented. 25 The social partnership agreements also contained industrial peace clauses, and an elaborate institutional structure for the resolution of disputes relating to their interpretation or implementation.
Before the Storm
The period of rapid growth in wealth creation and employment that occurred in Ireland between 1997 and 2007, therefore, was founded on a labour relations model with a number of constituent parts. First, workers were gaining access to an increasing volume of employment protection legislative measures. 26 In order to access protections, in the context of declining trade union workplace presence, workers did, however, have to navigate the complexity, delays, and costs associated with the individualised employment tribunal system. Secondly, there was a strong focus on the need for greater compliance with employment law, with the proposed 24 The National Minimum Wage Act 2000. solution residing in greater powers being allocated to the State's labour inspectorate, and greater reliance being placed on criminal sanctions for employment law breaches. Thirdly, most private sector employers were completely free to decide whether or not to negotiate with trade unions. However, there was "right to bargain" legislation, which provided some scope for unions to force uncooperative employers to engage with demands around pay, and other terms and conditions of employment.
Fourthly, in a number of sectors (notably construction, retail, catering, and hotels) sectoral collective agreements, or terms and conditions of employment agreed by sectoral labour committees, were extended erga omnes. Finally, social partner agreement, as set out in the various social pacts, was fundamental to setting terms and conditions of employment in the public sector and in the unionised private sector. 27 Thus, at the onset of the crisis, the Irish Anglo-Saxon model was somewhat precariously balanced. There was undoubtedly a move towards 'juridification' of (increasingly individualised) labour disputes, but the model still maintained a role for collective negotiation, and substantial social partner involvement in employment standard-setting, and monitoring.
Hell? (2008-2014)
The extent of Ireland's economic and social collapse from 2008 is by now welldocumented and understood. 28 The country's Gross Domestic Product collapsed, unemployment levels tripled in just four years, there was a rapid deterioration in the public finances, a collapse in the housing market and construction sector, and a liquidity crisis for the banking system. In 2008, the State (endorsed by the EU) decided to guarantee all banking debt, effectively socialising the crippling debts of the national financial institutions. In November 2010, the Irish government accepted the terms of an IMF-EU rescue package, totalling approximately €85 billion. The government agreed, as a precondition for receiving bail-out funds, to the adoption of an austerity program, the exact terms of which were provided for in the December 1 2010 Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) signed with the 'Troika' of the European Central Bank, the European Commission and the IMF. 29
Individual Rights
In the midst of such tumult, particularly the elements driven by external forces The system of individual dispute resolution mechanisms also remained untouched. However, with the numbers of claims for redundancy and unfair dismissal rising in parallel with falling employment levels and wide-scale corporate restructuring, and in the context of judicial concern around the "human rights implications" of the complexity, delays, and costs associated with the system, 32 the Government did publish a blueprint for reform (see, further, below). 33 In the context of the crisis, the focus on compliance arguably diminished, as employers, workers, and unions focused on job protection, and as the numbers of posted, and migrant, workers in the labour force declined. NERA (the new labour inspectorate) did, however, actively pursue its mandate, which included criminal prosecution of non- The "action" largely took place in the sphere of collective employment rights.
Somewhat ironically however, in the context of developments in other 'bail-out' countries, 35 developments largely resulted from decisions of the Irish superior courts.
It has been noted that, by contrast, for example, with the Greek case, little in terms of labour law reform was demanded by the Irish MoU concluded with the Troika. 36 The most significant requirement in this regard, was for the government to commission an independent review of the Registered Employment Agreement (REA) and Joint Labour Committee (JLC) arrangements, with terms of reference and follow-up actions to be agreed with the European Commission. This review was to be carried out in order to ensure there were no distortions of wage conditions across sectors associated with the presence of sectoral minimum wages in addition to the national minimum wage. The explanation for this light touch is relatively straightforward;
Ireland's labour market (with its floor of minimum standards and its weak protection for collective bargaining) was already subject to extremely light regulation.
Nonetheless, Ireland was still required to review one of the few areas of regulation that provided for collectively bargained standards and that allowed workers to benefit from collective representation without having to first "trigger" their rights. Achtsioglou and Doherty point out that what is significant "is the extent to which labour market regulation is to be 'micro-managed" by the EU institutions; even in relatively 'neoliberal' Ireland". 37 unit, but the judgment appeared to take the view that employers would be free to determine the form, structure and organisation of any internal collective bargaining units, as long as these have a degree of permanency and are not ad hoc. Doherty commented that this that this could mean that, were an employer to set up such a unit, it could presumably decide on issues such as how employees would be elected or chosen to be members, the remit of the unit, the terms of office of its members, and the rules and procedures of its operation. 44 The decision, as noted, was handed 
(iii) National Bargaining
The influence of the Troika in terms of the fate of national bargaining ("social partnership") was more overt. Initially, once the crisis hit, the social partners sought to continue the social partnership process, negotiating an 'interim wage agreement' in 2008. 46 However, as the economic and employment situation rapidly deteriorated, and an attempt to renegotiate the 2008 deal failed, the government unilaterally introduced an emergency budget, introducing pay cuts for all public servants.
Attempts to negotiate a new pact continued throughout 2009 and, in December, appeared to be on the verge of successful conclusion. However, a last minute revolt by government deputies over aspects of the deal relating to public sector reform led 44 Doherty, (2009), n 21, at 394. 45 Ibid, at 395. 46 O'Kelly (2010), n 28.
to the government withdrawing, and the effective end of the Irish social partnership process. 47 Reform of employment relations in the public sector was one of the key elements in addressing the crisis in Ireland prescribed by the Troika. Many of the broad parameters of the response were set out in the National Recovery Plan 2011-2014; 48 these are subsequently repeated, modified and monitored in the successive MoUs with the Troika. Reductions in public expenditure were to be achieved, in part by the reduction in numbers of public servants in the order of approximately 25,000, and by the generation of significant savings through the reform of work practices in the public sector. Compulsory redundancies were avoided; arguably, the main trade union success in the negotiations of the three public service agreements since 2010, the "Croke Park", "Haddington Road" and "Lansdowne Road" agreements. 49 Nevertheless, Ireland's public sector was dramatically reduced in size at a time when demands on core public services (in health, education and, particularly in the context of high unemployment, social security and welfare) were increasing. However, it is the manner in which the reforms have been implemented that may have more lasting effects. McDonagh and Dundon have pointed out that "the abandonment of social partnership" was, arguably, "central to the government's strategy of dealing with the crisis". 50 In 2013, the government announced that it wished to re-negotiate the terms of the 2010 Public Service Agreement ("Croke Park"), which still had at least one year to run. The manner of the "negotiation" is noteworthy. 51 The first attempt to re- 
Resurrection…? (2015-)

Individual Rights
A notable feature of the nascent economic recovery inIreland has been how quickly discourse has moved from a relentless focus on unemployment to a focus on lowpay and the working conditions of low-pay workers. The government has established a Low Pay Commission under the National Minimum Wage (Low Pay Commission) Act 2015, which, under section 6, is empowered to make recommendations to the Minister designed to set a minimum wage that is fair and sustainable, and when appropriate, is adjusted incrementally, and that, over time, is progressively increased to assist as many low-paid workers as is reasonably practicable without creating significant adverse consequences for employment or competitiveness. The Commission's first report recommended an increase of 50c in the national minimum wage. 53 In the context of a high-profile dispute at retailer Dunnes Stores, the issue of "zero-hour" contracts/ low hour contracts was the subject of a report published by the Department of Jobs, Enterprise and Innovation in November 2015, which made a number of recommendations for legislative action to protect workers on so-called "if and when" contracts (where workers are not contractually required to make themselves available for work, but are dependent on a particular employer). 54 In both cases, the legislative measures enacted, or proposed, may well be seen as welcome employment protections, but operate firmly within the traditional floor of rights model. 56 The WRC has a statutory duty, under section 11 of the 2015 Act to ensure high standards of compliance with employment legislation and equally high standards in the conduct of industrial relations generally. This is not the place to undertake a thorough review of the legislation. 57 It is sufficient to comment that, whilst the simplification of the system is long overdue, it remains to be seen whether the Act does provide an effective system of individual dispute resolution. Concerns may include that the first instance hearing will be in camera, that it will be before a single Adjudication Officer (who does not need to be a lawyer), and that the Act abolishes, at first instance, the tripartite "industrial jury" model. 58 Applications to establish such an Order may be made by a trade union (alone or jointly with an employer organisation) where the union is "substantially representative of the workers of the particular class, type or group in the economic sector" concerned. 64 It must be "normal, desirable or expedient' to have a SEO for pay, sick pay, and pension schemes in the sector concerned, taking into account the need for "harmonious relations" in the sector. 65 In coming to a decision on whether to recommend an Order to the Minister, the Labour Court must take into account a range of factors, including the potential impact on competitiveness in the sector, and the binding nature of the SEO on all workers and employers. 66 The Court must be satisfied that the making of an order is necessary in order to promote high standards of training, and to ensure fair and sustainable rates of remuneration, within the sector. 67 An employer in a sector where an SEO operates may plead 'inability to pay' (up to a maximum period of 24 months). 68
Collective Rights
(ii) Trade Union Recognition
The Act also, almost a decade on from the decision in Ryanair, amends the 'right to bargain' legislation, the Industrial Relations The provisions of the Act, therefore, apply only where such bargaining does not occur in an organisation, be that with a trade union, or an "excepted body", which is defined as: "a body which is independent and not under the domination and control of an employer or trade union of employers, all the members of which body are employed by the same employer and which carries on engagements or negotiations with the object of reaching agreement regarding the wages or other conditions of employment of its own members (but of no other employees". 70 In an attempt to deal with a frequent criticism of the Ryanair judgment (that the Supreme Court dicta had suggested something very close to a "company union" could satisfy the requirements), 71 the Labour Court is now required to assess excepted bodies to ensure their independence with regard to: the manner and frequency of the election of employees, the financing or resourcing that exceeds minimum logistical support provided by the employer, the length of time a body has been in existence, and any prior collective bargaining with the employer. 72 Previously, under the 2001-2004 Acts, a union could submit a claim in respect of any number of its members; in some cases, the unions involved pursued a claim where they declared to have a considerable existing presence, whilst in others claims were taken on behalf of a handful of employees only. 73 The new legislation requires that claims can only be taken where the number of workers party to the dispute is not insignificant, having regard to the total number of workers employed by the employer concerned in the grade, group or category to which the dispute refers, and by reference to the total number of workers employed by the employer in the group referring the dispute, relative to the total employed by the employer. 
But These Visions of Johanna… 79
So, after almost a decade of austerity, high unemployment, mass emigration, and social discord, Ireland is slowly emerging from the ruins of the crash. What does the labour law story sketched above tell us, and how does it fit with the wider European narrative?
The continuity of the Anglo-Saxon model has been noted. Individual the Directive on vindicating free movement of citizens' rights). 83 This is not to argue that such legislation is necessarily unwelcome. It is to point out, first, the narrow vision of labour law reform coming from the EU, and, secondly, to note that, whilst there is an acknowledgement in such legislation of the role and importance of social partner activities in ensuring the vindication of employment rights, there is little of substance that would seem to make these more likely, certainly in countries such as Ireland.
The discussion of reform of the employment tribunal system, although hugely significant to Irish workers and employers, may seem somewhat parochial. However, the broader significance echoes the points made by Novitz in her paper to [THE TCD SYMPOSIUM]. The reforms are all aimed at resolving disputes as close to the workplace as possible (via interventions by WRC "early resolution" officers, mediation, more active case management by Adjudication Officers, etc). This is admirable. It does lead to concerns, however, given the lack of support for individual workers at workplace level. Trade union presence is greatly diminished; the reasons for this are complex, and multi-faceted, but, certainly, a lack of legislative support for "Excepted bodies" are not widely in existence and, where they are, seem to be of the order of the body in Ryanair. The amendments in the 2015 Act may help guard against "company unions", but they are unlikely to spur the establishment of genuinely independent, non-union employee representative bodies (and neither is that the intention of the Act). Thus, there is a real danger, in the absence of adequate workplace level advocacy, support, and information structures, which are genuinely independent, of a drift to a US model of individual dispute resolution; notably, only workers with the means to access legal representation will be able to somewhat balance the scales of power. 85 The link between the vindication and enforcement of individual rights, and the role of collective representation, is important. Again, developments in Ireland in terms of collective employment law chime clearly with those at the level of the EU.
Reforms of the sectoral standard-setting mechanisms are very much to be welcomed; the government could have taken the option of simply abandoning these, given the views of the domestic judiciary, and the implicit direction of the Troika.
However, what has emerged is undoubtedly a truncated form of collective bargaining. Sectoral Employment Orders may now be applied for by a trade union alone; clearly this is not "bargaining" at all, but a mechanism for the unilateral imposition of sectoral standards by the (admittedly tri-partite) Labour Court, and subject to Ministerial veto. 86 This is likely to be an antagonistic process, where, undoubtedly, legal challenges will emerge. What we see, therefore, is a movement away from state-supported sectoral bargaining, to a system heavily reliant on statesanctioned legal standard-setting. In Ewing's terms, there is an ever greater emphasis on the "representative" function of trade unions, rather than the "regulatory" function of collective bargaining. 87 We see this too in relation to the "right to bargain" legislation. The manner in which that legislation came to be applied by the Labour Court arguably began to veer towards the legislation performing a more explicit regulatory and public function (in Ewing's terms) than initially appeared likely. In a number of cases, Lastly, as noted above, the approach to public sector bargaining has redefined traditional understandings of labour relations "negotiation"; the government was happy to engage in long, and difficult, negotiations with the public sector trade unions in order to reach an agreement. It was not willing, however, to leave the outcome to be subject to the vagaries of union democracy. Public sector union members were simply issued an ultimatum; accept the agreement or face legislation consensual, partnership approach to collective bargaining. The move is clearly towards setting legislative standards, which seem to operate as a "ceiling" rather than a "floor"; in the public sector, members of trade unions that do not accept the government's "negotiation" position will simply have terms and conditions set by law.
As noted, developments in Ireland seem perfectly consistent with recent jurisprudence of the Court of Justice. Barnard has noted that this case law reflects the "single market approach" of the CJEU, which sees the application of national labour law by a host state as a barrier to the provision of services under Article 56TFEU and therefore presumptively unlawful. This contrasts with the "labour law" perspective traditionally adopted by Ireland, the UK, and a number of other Member States, which seeks to apply national labour rules to all those working in the national territory in the name of equality, fairness and, crucially, good industrial relations 94 and which relies significantly on monitoring by the social partners.
Turning from the jurisprudence of the Court, a key response to the crisis, in addition to the terms of the MoUs agreed with the 'programme countries', has been the establishment of a strict economic governance package for all Eurozone countries. 95 
Conclusions: Gimme Hope Jo'anna?
The policy responses outlined above, however, were and are political choices; and political choices can be challenged and modified. It seems clear that a narrow focus on legislative floors of rights, which must be vindicated by individual workers in employment tribunals, and monitored and enforced by under resourced labour inspectorates, is inadequate to offer genuine protection to workers. The move towards reducing the scope for collectively bargained standards and social partner monitoring thereof, and towards the abandonment of social dialogue, in favour of regulation obsessed with financial monitoring and dominated by economic discourse must be reversed in order to achieve the Treaty aims of a "social market economy". 101 It may be, as some argue, that labour law can only ever provide a marginal correction to the worst excesses of (labour) market liberalisation and cannot, without more, modify the "bases and principles of the market's existence and functioning". 102 However, progressive legal change can be a start.
In this regard, let me cite three areas where reform could help. First, the new public procurement directives explicitly require Member States to take appropriate measures to ensure that, in the performance of public contracts, economic operators provide not only the possibility of stronger worker protection, but also some evidence of lesson-learning on the part of EU and national elites to present to a general populace which is increasingly cynical and angry following the corporate and regulatory failures leading to, and in some cases prolonging, the crisis. 
